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The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is at a critical junc-
ture caused by Washington’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
and Beijing’s support for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship. As the APEC Chair in 2017, Vietnam is urging members to focus on 
“Creating New Dynamism, Fostering a Shared Future,” renewing APEC’s 
agenda, and reaffirming objectives central to its development.
 • After a solid start and initial achievements, APEC has often been criticised for 
its slow delivery of tangible outcomes in regional trade and investment liberali-
sation. In 1994, APEC agreed to create a free trade and investment zone by the 
two-stage deadlines of 2010 for developed members and 2020 for developing 
economies. APEC is viewed as failing to expedite this agenda and as having 
credibility and identity crises.
 • The “flexibility” principle has caused sharp divisions within APEC: trade liber-
alisation energised by neoliberal ideologies and structural reforms on the one 
side, and economic and technical cooperation underpinned by developmental-
ist ideologies on the other. The APEC agenda has been swinging between dif-
ferent priorities depending on which member is chairing APEC in a given year. 
Such wavering has added to its identity crisis. 
 • The APEC Summit in November 2017 is under pressure to deliver a bold ini-
tiative to revitalise the forum and handle Trump’s protectionism. Vietnam is 
striving to strike a balance between liberal trade and development. The four 
priorities – sustainable and inclusive growth, regional economic integration, 
digitalisation, and sustainable agriculture in response to climate change – dem-
onstrate the host’s attempt to align APEC with global agendas, reassert APEC’s 
relevance, and defuse its internal crisis. 
Policy Implications
The road to freer trade in APEC looks bumpy. Although the United States has 
yet to clarify its new relationship with APEC, a likely outcome is that Asia may 
choose to transform APEC into an Asia-led grouping and balance US unilateral-
ism via closer ties with the EU. The door is open for the EU to reinforce its focus 
on Asia. If so, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) might be enhanced at APEC’s 
expense. 
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APEC and Its Internal Crisis
APEC came into being in 1989 as a regional economic grouping intended to pro-
mote trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. It started out as an informal 
ministerial-level meeting of 12 economies and within the first decade it developed 
into a transregional grouping of 21 economies. Together they represented approxi-
mately 60 per cent of world GDP and 50 per cent of world trade in 2015. APEC 
members include the world’s largest economies – the United States, China, and 
Japan – and a number of the world’s fastest growing economies (see Figure 1). 
Since 1993 APEC has evolved from a loosely structured forum into a more institu-
tionalised and goal-oriented grouping, with an annual APEC Economic Leaders’ 
Meeting that provides greater strategic vision for regional cooperation. At the 1994 
summit in Indonesia, the leaders set the ambitious target of creating a free and 
open trade and investment region –  by 2010 for developed economies and by 2020 
for developing economies. This set of goals was known as the Bogor Goals (Berger 
1999).
Looking back almost three decades, enthusiastic regionalists may regard APEC 
as a successful forum for economic and social advancement, measured in the growth 
of activity, trade and investment, and confidence-building in the region. The rapid 
economic growth of China and Vietnam has been attributed in part to their involve-
ment in APEC. APEC has also been considered an arena for geo-economic strate-
gies which focus on the use of economic instruments to create not only prosperity 
but also stability and peace in the region. APEC’s pragmatic and flexible approach 
to trade liberalisation has achieved progress in business mobility, customs proce-
dures, standards and regulations, and government procurement. Despite the or-
ganisation’s informal and voluntary institutional mechanisms, 14 APEC economies 
have implemented various stages of the Single Window system – a big step towards 
an integrated market in investment and customs procedures – and average tariffs 
fell from 17 per cent in 1989 to 5.6 per cent in 2014 (APEC 2017). Tariff reductions 
have also been implemented in many sectors, beyond and ahead of the WTO nego-
tiations – for example, via the 2001 agreement to voluntarily liberalise tariffs to no 
more than 5 per cent on environmental goods under the APEC list of 54 product 
categories (Vossenaar 2016; Yamazawa 2012).  
Figure 1  
APEC Real GDP 
Growth (year-on-
year, %), 2015–2016
Source: APEC Policy 
Support Unit 2017: 19.
   3    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 5 | OCTOBER 2017 
APEC is a large and complex grouping, with over 40 subcommittees and work-
ing groups as well as several hundred meetings and projects underway each year. 
However, APEC’s numerous meetings have often been seen as “talk shops” or “sum-
mit fashion shows,” and the acronym has even been interpreted as “A Perfect Ex-
cuse to Chat” due to the organisation’s slow and poor delivery of tangible outcomes. 
In its first two decades, APEC proved to be an informal regional forum for dialogue, 
consultation, and recommendations rather than a policy-coordinating and rule-
making body with a capacity for crisis management. Notably, APEC’s credibility 
and relevance were challenged by its failure to deal with the Asian financial crisis of 
1997–1998. This credibility crisis was particularly fuelled by the collapse of APEC’s 
attempt to implement the voluntary sectoral liberalisation suggested by the United 
States but opposed by Japan. The plethora of declarations, plans, and action agen-
das did not deliver substantive outcomes. Consequently, APEC changed from a site 
for an emerging East–West synthesis to a site for a new East–West divide. More 
recently, APEC activities have increasingly reflected competing geo-economic and 
geopolitical visions. On the one hand, the establishment of the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (TPP) led by the Obama and Abe administrations has experienced a setback 
with Trump’s withdrawal in January 2017. On the other hand, China has exhibited 
strong support for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) ini-
tiated by Indonesia. These new regional trade deals have further complicated the 
direction of APEC’s development. Thus, APEC appears to be suffering from a seri-
ous identity crisis. 
Although the Bogor Goals have been raised repeatedly at the annual summits, 
differences persist among APEC members in terms of their views and priorities re-
garding APEC’s two main pillars: Trade and Investment Liberalisation and Facili-
tation requiring structural reforms on the one hand, and Economic and Technical 
Cooperation emphasising inclusive development on the other. Consequently, the 
weight that members attach to regional activities differs. Furthermore, APEC’s non-
binding nature allows members to choose whether or not they implement recom-
mendations, to outline their preferences, and to set their own timetables. The APEC 
agenda has switched between different priorities depending on which country has 
chaired APEC in a given year. APEC has claimed to pursue a free trade programme 
with an “open regionalism” principle that extends the same treatment to non-APEC 
members, but this unconditional and unreciprocal principle has caused consider-
able controversy among APEC members and limited the willingness of some mem-
bers to proceed with APEC’s liberalisation policies (Wang and Coyle 2002).
In practice, APEC members avoid potential free-rider problems by granting 
each other bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). The proliferation of bilateral 
FTAs has increased the cost of doing business due to inconsistencies between vari-
ous elements of the agreements, such as different schedules for phasing out tariffs, 
different rules of origin, conflicting standards, exclusions, and different rules for 
dealing with disputes. The discrepancies between declarations and implementation 
have further added to APEC’s credibility crisis.
In brief, although some observers may still see APEC’s strength in its volun-
tary and informal processes, more people view APEC as standing at a crossroads 
and struggling with internal crisis. The twin crises of credibility and identity stem 
primarily from a lack of consensus over the grouping’s objectives and an absence 
of institutional capacity to drive the organisation (Park and Lee 2009; Ravenhill 
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2000). APEC members are attempting to overcome these crises by taking initiatives 
to build new regional institutions within the grouping.
APEC’s Regional Trade Deals:  
Geo-Economics Forges Geopolitics
The 2010 APEC Summit in Japan reviewed the progress towards the Bogor Goals 
and decided to take concrete steps to realise the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). Since then APEC has become an arena for different geo-economic strate-
gies, as reflected in different regional trade deals such as the TPP and the RCEP. 
These trade deals claim to be pathways to the overarching transregional trade area 
– FTAAP – but each constitutes a distinct geopolitical vision.
The TPP originates from the “Pacific Four” (P4) Group’s FTA, formed in 2006 
between Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei. The United States and other 
members had joined by 2008, but due to the US election, the first public announce-
ment of the trade deal was made by the Obama administration in 2009 and the first 
round of negotiations started in early 2010. After five years of negotiations, the TPP 
agreement, with 6,000 pages affecting more than 18,000 tariffs, was signed in Feb-
ruary 2016 by the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. In its most lofty form, the 
TPP could have created a new single market among the 12 countries, similar to the 
European Union, representing approximately 40 per cent of the global economy. 
The TPP aimed to be a comprehensive agreement with high-quality rules on trade 
and investment, the environment, and labour. It adhered more strictly to free trade 
and intellectual rules than the WTO. It also introduced the “Investor-Sate Dispute 
Settlement” mechanism, which would allow companies to sue states for violations 
of investment contracts. 
The Obama administration invested considerable political capital in pushing 
for the TPP and driving APEC away from its original informal and voluntary norms 
towards a legally binding mechanism. If the TPP were launched, the US would have 
succeeded in transforming APEC into a regional institution of the type that the US 
has long desired. The TPP has partly been seen as a revival of the original APEC free 
trade plan. The striking difference from the original APEC plan is the exclusion of 
China, although China has declared interest in the TPP and is paying close attention 
to it (Devadason 2014).
Trump has signed an executive order formally withdrawing the United States 
from the TPP, but APEC members appear to have other regional trade deals backed 
by China in place. APEC has thus become a useful arena for China, not only for 
countering the US strategy but also for pushing its own version of an economic al-
liance: the Asia-centric RCEP is seen as a short-term step towards FTAAP. China 
has signalled its determination to transcend the short-term separation between 
the “East Asia” and “trans-Pacific” tracks in order to embrace Asia-Pacific regional 
integration in the long term, including both itself and the United States (Scollay 
2016). At the 2014 APEC Summit in Beijing, China proposed a roadmap to FTAAP, 
but the United States did not want the Beijing initiative to eclipse the TPP, which 
was then entering the final stage of negotiations. The summit witnessed the United 
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States and China wrestling to win over other APEC members to their respective geo-
economic proposals: Obama’s TPP and Xi Jinping’s FTAAP. 
The United States’ objection to the Beijing Roadmap to FTAAP made China 
turn to its current regional trade priority, the RCEP. The RCEP was initiated by 
Indonesia in 2011 as a middle way between two other regional trade deals proposed 
by China and Japan under the framework of ASEAN+6 (China, Korea, Japan, India, 
Australia, and New Zealand). The RCEP aims to harmonise the existing and over-
lapping bilateral FTAs between the 16 Asian countries (see Figure 2).
In 2015 China again used APEC as an arena for its strategy. At the margin of the 
2015 APEC Summit in Manila, China signed up 15 RCEP countries (except Japan) 
as founding members of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is 
projected to provide major development aid for the China-led Belt and Road Initia-
tive. The RCEP (and AIIB) can be seen as China’s response to the TPP and as the 
reaction of some major ASEAN economies such as Indonesia and Thailand which 
are not yet signatories of the TPP.
Vietnam was set to be one of the major beneficiaries of the TPP. To save the agree-
ment, Vietnam has worked with the other signatories to convince them that it is 
worth staying with the agreement, even without the United States. So far none of 
the remaining 11 members has shown signs of withdrawing from the TPP. Japan 
and New Zealand ratified the TPP agreement in January and May 2017, respec-
tively. According to an official statement, Japan “intends to continue to tenaciously 
encourage other original signatories to promptly complete their domestic proce-
dures toward the entry into force of the TPP agreement, in light of the significance 
of the TPP” (Japanese MOFA 2017). New Zealand has also sent a clear message that 
the path is open for the United States to rejoin if it changes its mind and for other 
economies that can accept the high standards of the TPP (McClay 2017). Alongside 
the APEC trade ministers’ meeting in May 2017, Vietnam hosted a separate meeting 
of the 11 remaining TPP signatories. The first outcome of that meeting was a joint 
statement on launching a process to assess options for bringing the agreement into 
force expeditiously. The possible options will be discussed when the ministers meet 
again on the margins of the APEC Summit in November 2017 in Vietnam.
Figure 2  
Asia-Pacific Regional 
Trade Deals
Source: Jozuka 2017.
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In sum, the challenge to APEC regional economic integration is that the group-
ing’s shared objective risks being diminished due to a “national interests first” ap-
proach. Therefore, the key rationale for APEC is being tested. Trump has confirmed 
his participation in the upcoming APEC Summit, at which he is expected to clarify 
the United States’ new relationship with APEC. However, dealing with an unsup-
portive key member may ultimately lead the other members to question the rele-
vance of the United States for APEC.
Vietnam Navigates Change: Why and How?
Joining APEC in 1998 was a key step in Vietnam’s international economic inte-
gration, and hosting APEC for the second time after a decade is a top priority for 
Vietnam in 2017. Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that 13 out of 16 
FTAs Vietnam has signed or is negotiating are with APEC members. Its top-five ex-
port destinations are the United States, China, Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Nine 
of the top-ten foreign investors in Vietnam are Korea, Japan, Singapore, Chinese 
Taipei, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the United States, China, and Thailand. And 80 per 
cent of Vietnamese students abroad are studying in APEC countries, mainly Japan, 
Australia, the United States, China, Canada, and Singapore. 
“The APEC region has always been a corner-stone of our foreign policy. The fu-
ture of the Asia-Pacific is the future of Vietnam.” This statement, made at an APEC 
meeting in May 2017 by Vietnam’s deputy prime minister cum foreign minister, 
Mr. Pham Binh Minh, explains the necessity that Vietnam navigate change in order 
to boost the momentum of this regional grouping and mitigate its internal crises. 
Renewing the APEC agenda is a significant condition for reaching consensus among 
its members. In an interview with the Oxford Business Group, Mr. Pham stated, “as 
the host economy, Vietnam will play a significant role in defining themes, priorities 
and cooperation agendas for APEC in 2017. Together with other APEC members, we 
will create new dynamism for regional connectivity and growth, and foster the role 
of APEC as the leading economic cooperation mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region” 
(Pham, quoted in Oxford Business Group 2017).
As a member of both the TPP and RCEP, Vietnam is well aware that setting 
the agenda for APEC 2017 in a challenging regional geopolitical environment re-
quires much deliberation and international support. While preparing to take over 
the APEC chairmanship, Vietnam was invited to participate in the G20 meetings 
in Germany, which have been taking place since the end of 2016. One Vietnamese 
senior official shared, “this is the first time Vietnam is invited as the APEC chair and 
we are invited not only to the G20 Summit but also to participate in several minis-
terial and high-level meetings, especially the Sherpa meetings from last December, 
including the consultation process for drafting the G20 Declaration” (Interview 5 
July 2017).
At the G20 meetings, Vietnam had an opportunity to share the achievements 
and challenges in leading the APEC agenda. For instance, the APEC trade minis-
ters’ meeting in May was unable to reach a joint statement, and a Chair’s statement 
was issued instead. Vietnam is trying to create synergy between the G20 and APEC 
agendas; therefore, it makes sense for the country to draw on the experience of the 
G20 negotiations in order to better understand the positions of almost half of the 
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APEC members, which are also G20 members. This exposure to global multilateral 
cooperation in general and the opportunity to socialise with international partners 
have, to a certain extent, given Vietnam the impetus to strengthen its APEC chair-
manship, including its negotiation capacity, while also securing its international 
support.
Vietnam has decided on the four-point agenda for APEC this year. It covers 
sustainable, innovative, and inclusive growth; regional economic integration; digi-
talisation; and sustainable agriculture in response to climate change. This agenda 
has shown the host’s effort to link APEC with global agendas in the hope of achiev-
ing consensus among all APEC members. During its APEC chairmanship since the 
beginning of this year, Hanoi has been striving to raise the quality and effectiveness 
of its multilateral diplomacy to a higher level and to introduce the world to a re-
formed and dynamic Vietnam that is taking an active part in building and shaping 
multilateral institutions.
However, while acknowledging the uncertain future of the TPP, the Vietnamese 
official quoted above did not conceal the fact that the Vietnam–EU FTA and the 
strong Vietnam–Germany partnership were also rationales behind the country’s in-
vitation to and participation in the G20. Prior to the G20 Summit, the Vietnamese 
prime minister’s visit to Germany, which was accompanied by a “road show” of 
some 200 Vietnamese enterprises, demonstrated the country’s attempt to diversify 
its trade partners and reduce its heavy dependence on the APEC trade deals, espe-
cially the TPP. The Vietnam–EU FTA, which was signed in 2015 and is expected to 
come into effect in 2018, will eliminate nearly all tariffs, including tax on fisheries, 
pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. This FTA is expected to contribute an additional 8 
per cent to Vietnam’s GDP by 2025. In this context, Vietnam has invited Germany 
to participate in the upcoming APEC Summit, marking the first time a European 
country has been asked to attend.  
Possible Scenarios
Given the current rise of protectionism, the path to freer trade within APEC is un-
certain. There are two scenarios. The first is that the Asian members choose to 
transform APEC into an Asia-led grouping and keep open the relationship with the 
United States. This would mean that APEC would continue to further its agenda, 
which combines both trade liberalisation and development cooperation, but would 
involve the United States to a certain extent – without letting it influence the agen-
da and processes. One consequence of such an approach would be the growing ir-
relevance of the United States for APEC on the core issues. Although the 11 APEC 
members have yet to announce their decisions about the TPP’s future, one challenge 
for the TPP to take effect is to change the condition requiring at least six countries 
representing 85 per cent of the original signatories’ GDP to ratify the agreement 
within two years of signing. The Japanese prime minister has said, “there is no 
doubt that there would be a pivot to the RCEP if the TPP does not go forward. The 
RCEP does not include the US, leaving China the economy with the largest gross 
domestic product” (Kyodo 2016). 
The second scenario, complementing but not replacing the first, is that Asian 
APEC members and Europe strengthen their partnership under the Asia-Europe 
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Meeting (ASEM) framework. This year has witnessed the resurrection of Asia–Eu-
rope trade talks. In March, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and the 
ASEAN economic ministers announced that they wish to revive plans for an FTA. 
The commissioner said, “having a region-to-region agreement between EU and 
ASEAN is a long-term goal we’ve been discussing for many years. We are now tak-
ing steps towards this” (Deutsche Welle 2017).
The EU and ASEAN launched a bi-regional trade deal in 2007, but the process 
was halted in 2009. The EU opted instead to conduct bilateral negotiations with 
individual ASEAN countries. So far, the EU has signed FTAs with Singapore and 
Vietnam, and negotiations are underway with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. In a similar vein, in July the EU and Japan reached two landmark 
agreements, the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement. In September, the free trade talks between the EU, Australia, and New 
Zealand were agreed to be on fast track. Will all these FTAs with the EU help raise 
the standards for the China-supported RCEP and enhance the EU’s leadership in 
setting global trade rules?
Implications for Europe
The opportunity is open for Europe to seize and reinforce its focus on Asia. In May 
this year, high-level Asian and European officials resumed their trade talks to fur-
ther the open and rules-based multilateral trading system and asserted their com-
mitment to fighting protectionism and unfair trade practices. In September 2017, 
the 7th ASEM Economic Ministers’ Meeting took place in Korea after a 12-year hia-
tus. Under the theme “Reconnecting Asia-Europe: Innovative Partnership for In-
clusive Prosperity,” the meeting focused on (a) facilitating and promoting trade and 
investment, (b) strengthening economic connectivity, and (c) fostering sustainable 
and inclusive growth. This ASEM trade meeting laid the foundation for discussions 
at the ministerial conference of the WTO, to be held in December this year (ASEM 
2017).
The ministers also made plans to revitalise the ASEM Trade Facilitation Action 
Plan and the ASEM Investment Promotion Action Plan. They also supported the 
work of the newly established ASEM Pathfinder Group on Connectivity, which aims 
to enhance physical connectivity (transportation), institutional connectivity (rules 
and regulations), and people-to-people connectivity (knowledge and culture). The 
ASEM digital connectivity initiative has inspired the ministers to take stock and 
implement further steps to revitalise the work on e-commerce in the WTO. The 
ASEM physical connectivity initiative has seen the emergence of the EU-ASEAN 
Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement as a result of the concrete negotiations 
in 2016 and 2017. ASEM also discussed the great trade and investment potential 
of cross-border energy networks in the ASEM region, as part of which quality in-
frastructure investment and social and environmental impacts are of interest and 
concern for both Asia and Europe. The ASEM people-to-people connectivity will be 
further enhanced by the upcoming ASEM Education Ministers’ Meeting in Seoul 
in November, which will mark one decade of ASEM higher education cooperation. 
ASEM also offers a broader platform for the EU to coordinate actions and to 
discuss the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, for which 14 EU countries (Austria, 
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Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Nether lands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) have signed up 
as founding members of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB website). 
As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, China and 16 Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries (11 EU and 5 non-EU states) have established the “1+16” group for 
cooperation (www.china-ceec.org). Some infrastructure projects have been agreed 
within this new group – for example, the modernisation of the Budapest–Belgrade 
high-speed rail line. A more coordinated European response would be desirable to 
prevent possible infringement of the EU rule on government procurement. More-
over, possible forms of cooperation, such as high-level sectoral meetings, should be 
considered. The third ASEM Transport Ministers’ Meeting in Riga in 2015 was well 
attended, but the fourth meeting in September of this year in Indonesia was not well 
attended by the European ministers (only six).
These various activities have important implications for Europe and Asia. De-
pending on how substantive and binding an economic partnership the EU wants 
to achieve, the ASEM framework may work well with the RCEP because they share 
the advantage of being based on the consensus model, which is flexible and ac-
commodating for all involved. In summary, both scenarios send a powerful signal 
that cooperation, not protectionism, is the way to overcome crisis and tackle global 
challenges.
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